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RECENT DECISIONS
Admissibility of Hospital Records Under Section 327.25, Wis-
consin Statutes: Prior to 1963, the controlling law in Wisconsin with
respect to the admission into evidence of records made in the regular
course of business and particularly hospital records was that stated in
Bielke v. Knaack.1 In construing section 327.25, Wisconsin Statutes, as
it then existed, 2 the court in the Bielke3 case held that it was error to
admit hospital records in evidence without the testimony of the en-
trants or a showing that the entrants were beyond the jurisdiction of
the court, dead or insane. This construction of section 327.25 was not
contested for nearly 30 years. 4
The Bielke decision was put in issue in Rupp v. Travelers Indemnity
Co.5 This case involved a trial to the court solely on the issue of dam-
ages relating to medical expenses, pain and suffering and disability
arising out of an automobile accident. The plaintiff offered in evidence
certain hospital records as entries made in the usual course of business
under section 327.25 but did not call any doctor, nurse, intern or em-
ployee to identify or verify the records or offer to show that such
persons were beyond the jurisdiction of the court, dead or insane. The
trial court refused to admit the records on the ground that the proper
foundation required by section 327.25 was not made and cited the
Bielke case as controlling.6 On appeal the supreme court held that
under the existing statute it had no alternative but to affirm the trial
court's decision. 7 The court noted that the equivalent federal rule em-
1207 Wis. 490, 242 N.W. 176 (1932).
2 Wis. STAT. §327.25 (1931): "Entries on cards, sales slips, loose leaf sheets
or in a book or other permanent form (other than those mentioned in sections
327.24 and 328.24), in the usual course of business, contemporaneous with
the transactions to which they relate and as part of or connected with such
transactions, made by persons authorized to make the same, may be re-
ceived in evidence when shown to have been so made upon the testimony
either of the person who made the same, or if he be beyond the jurisdiction
of the court or insane, of any person having custody of the entries, and
testifying that the same were made by a person authorized to make them
in whose handwriting they are, and that they are true and correct to the best
of his knowledge and belief."
3 Bielke, supra note 1.
4 See Stella Cheese Co. v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. R. Co., 248 Wis. 196, 21
N.W. 2d 655 (1946) wherein the court noted that the statute should receive a
liberal interpretation to carry out its purpose.
17 Wis. 2d 16, 115 N.W. 2d 612 (1961).
6At page 23 of the official report the court also held that an additional ground
for inadmissibility existed due to the fact that some of the doctor's entries
were illegible and the trial court and the attorneys were in dispute as to
their meaning.
7At page 22 of the official report the court said: "While we recognize the
force of the plaintiff's argument we cannot either construe or modify sec.
327.25, Stats., as urged. We cannot interpret the section, no matter how
liberally, so as to excise from the statute the express requirement that entries
must be identified by the testimony of the entrants if it is not shown they
are beyond the jurisdiction or insane."
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bodied in 28 U.S.C. section 1732 has generally been interpreted to
admit in evidence hospital records. 9 However, although the Wisconsin
statute did recognize modern business practices by excusing the neces-
sity of producing all the entrants, the court noted that this exception
does not apply to hospital records. The court further noted that a
"practical-necessity" argument could be made that the statute logically
should extend to hospital records where there are multiple entrants
but that this could not be done under the statute as it then existed with-
out calling the entrants or showing that they were beyond the jurisdic-
tion of the court, dead or insane and that the statute could not be modi-
fied on appeal but only in compliance with section 251.18 of the Wis-
consin Statutes.1°
In compliance with section 251.18 and upon the recommendation
of the Wisconsin Judicial Council, the supreme court did modify sec-
tion 327.25 by promulgation of Court Rules in 17 Wis. 2d xxiii. The
Court Rules repealed sections 327.24 and 327.25 and recreated section
327.25 in essentially the same form as it is now found in the 1963
Wisconsin Statutes."1 Mowever, the Court Rules also created a second
subsection for section 327.25:
8 28 U.S.C. §1732: "In any court of the United States and in any court estab-
lished by Act of Congress, any writing or record, whether in the form of an
entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act,
transaction, occurrence, or event, shall be admissible as evidence of such act,
transaction, occurrence, or event, if made in regular course of any business,
and if it was the regular course of such business to make such memorandum
or record at the time of such act, transaction, occurrence, or event or within
a reasonable time thereafter.
"All other circumstances of the making of such writing or record, includ-
ing lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to
affect its weight, but such circumstances shall not affect its admissibility.
"The term 'business' as used in this section, includes business, profession,
occupation, and calling of every kind."
9 At page 21 of the official report the court stated:
"It is true, the federal rule has 'generally been interpreted to admit into
the record the hospital records. See cases in the annotation, 28 U.S.C., p. 480,
sec. 1732, note 18. The policy basis for considering hospital records as an ex-
ception to the hearsay rule is well stated in 6 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.),
p. 36, sec. 1707. In summary, Wigmore states that the medical records of
patients in a modem hospital contain a circumstantial guaranty of trust-
worthiness because of the manner and purpose for which they are kept and
the reliance placed upon them by the doctors and nurses in the affairs of life
and death, and also there is a practical necessity for the admission of such
records because the requirements of calling on individual doctors, nurses, and
attendants who have co-operated in making the record, would seriously inter-
fere with the hospital administration."
10 WIs. STAT. §251.18 (1963), provides that a statute relating to pleading, prac-
tice, and procedure may be modified or suspended by rules promulgated after
the court had held a public hearing with reference thereto upon notice by
publication for three successive weeks in the official state paper. The court
in the Rupp case noted that the court customarily submitted problems of this
nature initially to the judicial council of Wisconsin for study and report of
the merits of the proposed change and that this matter would be called to the
attention of the juricial council.
11 Wis. STAT. §327.25 (1963) : "Any writing or record, whether in the form of
an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act,
transaction, occurrence or event, shall be admissible as evidence of such act,
[Vol. 49
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327.25 ENTRIES IN THE USUAL COURSE OF BUSI-
NESS; MEDICAL RECORDS: (1) Any writing or record,
whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made
as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, or oc-
currence or event, is admissible in evidence in proof of said
act, transaction, occurrence or event, if the trial judge finds that
it was made in the regular course of any business, and that it
was the regular course of such business to make such memoran-
dum or record at the time of such act, transaction, occurrence or
event or within a reasonable time thereafter. All other circum-
stances of the making of such writing or record, including lack
of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown
to affect its weight, but they shall not affect its admissibility. The
term "business" includes businesses, professions, occupations and
callings of every kind.
(2) Subsection (1) applies to entries made in medical or
hospital records if entries relate to treatment given or examina-
-tion conducted within this state. No such entry or portion
thereof which constitutes a medical opinion or diagnosis may be
admitted in evidence under this subsection except by stipulation
of the parties or except when offered against the interest of a
party by whom or under whose supervision such entry or por-
tion thereof was made.
Section 327.25(2), as promulgated by the supreme court, excluded
medical entries relative to treatment given outside the state and, more
important, entries which constituted medical opinion or diagnosis un-
less they were offered by stipulation or as admissions by the entrant.
The new section 327.25 as promulgated by the supreme court became
effective July 15, 1963.
Shortly after this action was taken by the supreme court, the
Wisconsin legislature created a new section 327.25.12 This legislative
enactment became effective August 23, 1963. Section 327.25, as enacted
by the legislature, eliminated subsection (2) of the supreme court's
statute and reenacted subsection (1) in substance despite the fact that
the existence and content of subsection (2) was undoubtedly made
known to the legislature during the hearings on the proposed bill.
Thus, the current section 327.25 is essentially the same as the federal
rule and logically should be interpreted similarly.
Under the current section 327.25, for an entry to be admissible, the
following criteria must be met:
transaction, occurrence or event, if the custodian or other qualified witness
testifies to its identity and mode of preparation, and if made in regular course
of any business and if it was the regular course of such business to make
such memorandum or record at the time of such act, transaction, occurrence
or event or within a reasonable time thereafter. All other circumstances of
the making of such writing or record, including lack of personal knowledge
by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect its weight, but such circum-
stances shall not affect its admissibility. The term 'business,' as used in this
section, includes businesses, profession, occupation and calling of every kind."
12L. 1963 C. 256, amended by L. 1963 C. 459 sec. 59.
196
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
1. It must have been made in the regular course of business as
a memorandum or record of any act performed in the regular
course of the business.
2. It must have been made at the time of the act or within a
reasonable time thereafter.
3. A foundation must be layed by the custodian of the records
or other qualified witness by testifying to its identity and
mode of preparation and that it was made in the regular
course of business.
Thus, section 327.25 no longer requires authentication of the record
by the entrant or a showing that the entrant is dead, insane or beyond
the jurisdiction of the court, as was required under the statute as it
originmly existed.
IMPORTANT FEDERAL DECISIONS RELATING To
ADMISSION OF DIAGNOSTIC HOSPITAL RECORDS
It was noted by the court in the Rupp case that the federal equiva-
lent13 of the current section 327.25 has generally been interpreted so
as to allow the admission into evidence hospital records without the
authentication of the record by the entrant or the showing that he be
dead, insane or beyond the jurisdiction of the court. This admissibility
of hospital records, in a majority of federal circuits, extends also to
records containing a doctor's diagnosis or opinion. 14
13 Note 8, supra.
14 Federal courts not allowing admission of hospital records containing diagnosis
and opinion under the federal shop-book rule.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia: New York Life v. Taylor, 79
U.S. App. D.C. 66, 147 F. 2d 297, 300 (1964) : "A literal reading of the [federal
shop-book rule] would make the records in this case admissible on the theory
that the business of operating a hospital requires records of the histories of
patients, reports of unusual conduct and also diagnosis by physicians. But the
Supreme Court in Palmer v. Hoffman ((1943) 318 U.S. 109, 63 S.Ct. 477, 87
L. Ed. 645, 144 A.L.R. 719) has, we believe, limited the admission of records
under the Federal Shop Book Rule statute to those which are trustworthy be-
cause they represent routine reflections of the day-to-day operations. The
opinion in that case held that the statute is not one 'which opens wide the door
to avoidance of cross-examination.' . . .The Supreme Court has stated that
the test of admissibility must be 'the character of the records and their ear-
marks of reliability . . . acquired from their source and origin and the nature
of their compilation.' To admit a narrative report to an event, or a conversa-
tion, or a diagnosis as a substitute for oral testimony, is to give any large
organization the right to use self-serving statements without the important test
of cross-examination. Cross-examination is unimportant in a case of systematic
routine entries made by a large organization where skill of observation and
judgment is not a factor. We believe that Palmer v. Hoffman restricts the
application of the Federal Shop Book Rule Statute to that type of business
entry."; Polisnik v. U.S., 104 U.S. App. DC 136, 259 F. 2d 951 (1958) ; Lyles
v. U.S., 103 U.S. App. DC 22, 254 F 2d 725 (1954); Washington Coca Cola
Bottling Works, Inc. v. Tawney, 98 U.S. App. DC 151, 233 F. 2d 353 (1956)
Wheeler v. U.S., 93 U.S. App. DC 159, 211 F. 2d 19 (1953).
COURT OF APPEALS, 5TH CIRCUIT: Mulligan v. U.S., 252 F. 2d 398, 404 (1958)(diagnosis of patient's mental condition held properly excluded) ; England v.
U.S., 174 F. 2d 466 (1949) (opinions as to sanity based on hearsay held prop-
erly excluded) ; Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Soileau, 265 F. 2d 90 (1959).
COURT OF APPEALS, 6TH CIRCUIT: Baltimore & Ohio v. Oneill, 211 F. 2d 190(1954) (recorded statement as to interpretation of x-ray held not admissible).
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In Kissinger v. Frankhouseni5 the court held that a U.S. Naval
Hospital record, including an entry by a doctor evaluating the results
of a Bogen's test for intoxication, was admissible under the federal
shop-book rule without testimony by the doctor or a showing that he
was dead, insane or beyond the jurisdiction of the court where the
test was performed in the regular course of the hospital's business and
recorded according to the regular routine of the institution. And, al-
though the issue was not raised on appeal, the court noted that the
doctor's initial impression made before the Bogen's test was adminis-
tered and entered on the clinical record ("Simple Drunkenness") was
also admissible under the rule. In the companion case of Thomas v.
Hogan 6 it was held that for the hospital record to be admissible under
the federal rule it was not necessary to state the qualifications of the
entrant or the steps taken in the procedure recorded because the rule
supplies a presumption that the diagnosis or tests were properly made
by qualified personnel if the recorded information reflects the usual
routine of the hospital and if it is the normal practice to record such
data contemporaneously or within a reasonable time. And, if the entry
is made under the requisite conditions of the federal shop-book rule,
it makes no difference whether the record reflects expressions of
medical opinion or observations of objective fact:
However, in the 6th Circuit hospital records may be admissible to show ad-
ministrative matters-Ranger v. Equitable Life Insurance Society of United
States, 196 F. 2d 968 (1952). Federal courts allowing admission of hospital
records containing diagnosis and opinion under the federal shop-book rule.
COURT OF APPEALS, 2ND CIRcuIT: White v. Zutell, 263 F. 2d 613 (1959); (de-
tailed report of doctor's medical findings held admissible); Terrasi v. South
Atlantic Lines, 226 F. 2d 823 (1955) (diagnosis of "fairly pronounced shock"
held admissible); Buchminister's Estate v. Com'r., 147 F. 2d 331 (1944)
(diagnosis of cerebral hemorrhage held admissible) ; Reed v. Order of United
Commercial Travelers, 123 F. 2d 252 (1941) (diagnosis that patient "still
apparently well under the influence of alcohol" held admissible); Korte Y.
N.Y., N.H. & A.R. Co., 191 F. 2d 86 (1951); U.S. v. N.Y. Foreign Trade
Zone Operators, Inc., 304 F. 2d 792 (1962).
COURT OF APPEALS, 3PiD CIRCUIT: Bartowski v. Pittsburg & Lake Erie R. R.
Co., 172 F. 2d 1007 (1949) (hospital record showing condition of patient ad-
missible) ; Norwood v. Great American Indemnity Co., 146 F. 2d 797 (1944)
(autopsy report admissible as business record).
COURT OF APPEALS, 4TH CIRCUIT: Thomas v. Hogan, 308 F. 2d 355 (1962) (eval-
uation of Bogerl's test made for determination of alcoholic content of blood
held admissible) ; Kissinger v. Frankhousen, 308 F. 2d 348 (1962) (evaluation
of Bogen's test held admissible).
COURT OF APPEAL., 7TH CIRCUIT: U.S. v. Ware, 247 F. 2d 698 (1957) (record of
analysis by government chemist held admissible as business record) ; Brucher
v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 217 F. 2d 876 (1954).
COURT OF APPEALS, 8TH CIRcuT: Glawe v. Rulton, 284 F. 2d 495 (1960) (medi-
cal opinion held admissible); Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co. of Texas v.
Ridgway, 191 F. 2d 363 (1951) (hospital record noting extent of injuries held
admissible.
COURT OF APPEALS, 9TH CIRCUIT: Lew Moon Cheung v. Rogers, 272 F. 2d 354(1959) (blood test admissible as business record) ; Medina v. Erickson, 226 F.
2d 475 (1955) (diagnosis of "bronchogenic carcinoma" and "melostosis of the
liver" held admissible).
15 308 F. 2d 348 (1962).
16 308 F. 2d 355 (1962).
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Consistently, hospital records have been held to be admissible
under the statute, for, as Dean McCormick explains, "the safe-
gxaard for trustworthness ... of the records of a modern hospital
are at least as substantial as the guaranties of reliability of the
records of business establishments." MCCORMICK, Evidence 609
(1954).",
The opinion further comments that in some circuits the shop-book
rule is not extended to a record entry of a diagnostic opinion of a
doctor as to the results of a scientific test which requires expertise to
conduct or interpret but that it has been held in other circuits that
records routinely made of diagnostic or scientific tests which are done
in the regular course of a hospital's business are entitled to admission
under a presumption of trustworthiness without testimony by the entrant
or a showing that he is dead, insane or beyond the jurisdiction of the
court."' The court noted that under this interpretation the opposing
party would lose his right of cross-examination of the doctor who made
the entry but that this is the case in nearly all exceptions to the hearsay
rule and that they are deemed justified because the circumstances assure
the probable verity of the evidence. However, counsel may still attack
the regularity of the procedure and the competence of the entrant19
but this goes to the weight and not the admissibility of the evidence.
In Medina v. Erickson ° the federal shop-book rule was held to
admit, without the testimony of the doctor or a showing that he was
dead, insane or beyond the jurisdiction of the court, consultation re-
ports made by doctors who examined the plaintiff upon a showing that
the records were made in accordance with hospital regulations even
though the reports contained hearsay and denied the defendants the
right of cross-examination of the entrants.
And, in the recent case of Horton v. Moore-McCormack Lines,
Inc.,2  the rule that hospital records are admissible as records made in
the regular course of business was affirmed.
17 Id. at 359.
is Note 14, supra.
19 These problems inherent in the federal rule were noted in the Rupp case
wherein at page 22 of the official report the court stated: "The effect of the
contended rule would shift the issue from admissibility to credibility and place
a greater burden on the party attacking the trustworthiness of the entries ... "
For a discussion of these problems see Arnold, Medical Evidence in Wisconsin,
39 'Marq. L. Rev. 289 (1956), and Swietlik, Hearsay Rule in Wisconsin, Vol.
II, No. 2, Wisconsin Continuing Legal Education, p. 1 (April, 1962). Also, see
Skogstad and Kappa, Admissibility of Business Entries, 1958 Wis. L. Rev. 245.
It should be noted that in Dean Swietlik's article the author advocated the
repeal of the then existing section 327.24 and the amendment of the then
existing section 327.25 so as to conform more closely with modem statutes.
The author noted that hospital records insofar as they contain a physician's
diagnosis were not admissible under the then existing statutes even though the
physician be dead, insane or otherwise unavailable.
20226 F. 2d 475 (1955).
21326 F. 2d 104 (1964).
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STATUS OF THE CURRENT WISCONSIN STATUTE
The current section 327.25 has not been construed by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court as to whether it will allow the admission in evidence
of hospital records containing diagnosis or opinion under the regular
entries exception to the hearsay rule without the testimony of the en-
trants or the showing that they are dead, insane or beyond the juris-
diction of the court. As heretofore noted, the Wisconsin statute is
essentially the same as the federal code section and should thus be
similiarly construed. However, the history of section 327.25 is such
as to indicate that the Wisconsin Supreme Court may be inclined to
hold otherwise, at least to the extent that the records contain diagnostic
opinions. This is, of course, due to the fact that the prior statute as
promulgated by the court contained a section which expressly excluded
medical diagnosis and opinion from the rule. Although the legislature
repealed this section, it is possible that the failure of the legislature to
specifically state that records containing diagnosis and opinion are ad-
missible under the statute may be viewed by the court as an opening
for holding that such records are still not within the scope of the
statute. The recent case of Zweiffel v. Milwaukee Automobile Mutual
Insurance Co. 22 does indirectly give some credence to such a speculation.
In this appeal the appellant contended, as one of a number of alleged
errors, that it was error for the trial court not to allow the jury to
consider hospital records which contained the notation "old healed
fract of nose with septal deviation" under the heading of "Diagnosis. '23
The supreme court cited section 327.25(2), which is the now repealed
subsection which had been created by the supreme court, and noted
that this subsection permits introduction of hospital records except to
the extent that they contain "medical opinion and diagnosis." The court
held that it was thus in the discretion of the trial court as to whether
these records should have been submitted to the jury or not but that
in any event it was not prejudicial to reject the evidence because the
facts relating to the injury in question were fully brought out in other
testimony. It is interesting to note that nowhere in the opinion did
the court recognize that subsection (2) of section 327.25, as created
by the supreme court, has been repealed by the legislature. Perhaps
this is indicative of the attitude the court will take towards hospital
records which contain diagnostic information the next time the issue
is before the court. In any event, the failure of the court to at least
note that their court rule exempting medical opinion and diagnosis
from the shop-book rule is no longer in effect is difficult to understand.
CONCLUSION
The Wisconsin statutes, prior to July 15, 1963, regulating the ad-
2228 Wis. 2d 249, 137 N.W. 2d 6 (1965).
23 Id. at 260 of official report.
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mission of records made in the regular course of business, including
hospital records, required a foundation of testimony by the entrant or
a showing that the entrant was dead, insane or beyond the jurisdiction
of the court. In 1963 the Wisconsin Supreme Court, under its court
rules power, promulgated a new statute similar to the federal shop-book
rule whch does not require such a foundation or showing for regular
entries. But, the court qualified the federal rule by exempting hospital
records containing medical diagnosis or opinion from the rule. Shortly
thereafter the legislature repealed the statute as created by the supreme
court and enacted the currently existing section 327.25 which is in
substance the same as the federal shop-book rule. Under the federal
rule, in the majority of circuits, hospital records made in the regular
course of business and containing medical diagnosis and opinion are
admissible without testimony by the entrant. Under the reenactment
rule of construction the Wisconsin statute should now be similarly
construed. However, the recent Zweiffe124 case indicates that the
Wisconsin Supreme Court has not forgotten the~restriction they orig-
inally placed upon the shop-book rule in re medical diagnosis and
opinion. It is concluded that any future decision recognizing the force
of this now repealed exception to the shop-book rule will clearly be
contrary to the existing section 327.25 and the applicable rule govern-
ing its construction. However, this conclusion is not intended to reflect
the author's opinion to the relative merit of either the court's or the
legislature's version of the statute.
It might further be noted that even if the court should hold that
medical records containing diagnosis and opinion do not fall within
the purview of the regular entry exception to the hearsay rule as
embodied in the shop-book rule, this would not preclude a doctor other
that the original entrant from forming and testifying as to an opinion




Unauthorized Practice of Law: Necessity of Executor to Ap-
pear by Attorney in Probate Proceeding--Petitioner J. Gordon
Baker's mother died testate, naming him executor in her will. Peti-
tioner, also a residuary legatee of a one-fourth share of the estate,
retained attorneys, who appeared for him at the beginning of the pro-
bate proceedings. A petition to probate the will was filed, the will was
admitted, and petitioner was appointed executor. An inventory was
filed, disclosing personal property of $167,863.14 and real estate worth
$4,000.
24 Zweiffel, supra note 22.
25 See Sundquist v. Madison Railways C. (1928) 197 Wis. 83, 221 N.W. 392, fol-
lowed in Chapnitsky v. McClove (1962) 20 Wis. 2d 453, 122 N.W. 2d 400.
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